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Abstract 
The movement of evidence-based policy-making has gained considerable attention in recent 
years. We can observe an increased production of research-based information about the 
effectiveness (performance) of public policies. Existing research shows that such information 
rarely prevails in democratic politics, but has remained inconclusive about the conditions 
affecting its relevance in policy-making. This paper aims first to clarify the conditions 
shaping the role of performance information in policy-making, and second presents empirical 
findings from twelve cases studies dealing with legislative revisions of policy measures in the 
fields of traffic safety, health and asylum policy in Switzerland. The analysis provides an 
assessment of how the creation and diffusion of performance information as well as the 
political context affect the role of such information in revisions of federal legislation in 
Switzerland. 
 
Version October 21, 2009. 
Introduction 
Compared with other countries such as the U.K., Sweden or the U.S., Switzerland is not 
considered to be a front-runner in introducing and promoting evidence-based policy-making. 
Nevertheless, we can observe an increasing production of evaluations as concomitant to 
various steering reforms in Switzerland (Widmer and Neuenschwander 2004; Balthasar 2007; 
Beywl and Widmer 2009). This paper investigates the role of systematic evidence about the 
effectiveness and efficiency of policy measures, so called ‘performance information’, in 
legislative revisions at the Swiss federal level. The question is, whether we can observe 
feedback loops of ‘problem solution – performance – revised problem solution’ and if yes, 
under which conditions are they most likely to occur? 
Research findings from the 1980s show that scientific argumentation, evaluation findings, and 
recommendations play a little role in decision making in Switzerland (Germann 1991; Klöti 
and Schneider 1989; Freiburghaus and Zimmermann 1985). More recent research generally 
confirms this observation and emphasizes that policy-making in Switzerland is more oriented 
towards gathering support than towards gathering evidence. To avoid failures in subsequent 
plebiscites, the administration, government and parliament are strongly concerned to ensure 
broad support prior to suggesting any new policy. Only under specific circumstances 
empirical evidence plays a crucial role in policy formulation in Switzerland (Widmer and 
Neuenschwander 2004, 391). However, research has remained inconclusive about the 
conditions affecting the relevance of performance information in decision making. This study 
aims to contribute to the clarification of these conditions by developing and testing an 
integrative framework drawing on utilization research and on the policy literature focussing 
on the role of ideas. The integrative framework is organized by the idea of a flow of 
information and differentiates between three types of conditions, namely the ‘characteristics 
of existing performance information’, the ‘diffusion of such information by mass media’ and 
the ‘political context’ that shape the role of performance information in legislative revisions. 
Existing empirical studies mainly focus on evidence from particular sources and restrict 
themselves on particular instances of information utilization (Webber 1991). This study 
proposes to follow an alternative approach: first, the analysis concentrates on the influence of 
performance information within policy revision processes. Second, the analysis incorporates 
all sources of performance information that are available to policy makers. The analysis 
includes not only information about the performance of policy measures implemented in 
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Switzerland, in the following addressed as ‘Swiss specific information, but also analogue 
information from other countries. So far, very few studies have followed such an approach 
(for one of the rare examples in Switzerland, see Klöti and Schneider 1989). The empirical 
analysis is based on a comparative case study design and concentrates on twelve adaptations 
of policy measures embedded in six revisions of federal legislation in three different policy 
fields. This research design allows for intra as well as cross policy comparisons. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the next section ‘performance information’ is defined, 
thereafter the theoretical framework and the research design is outlined. In the next part of the 
paper, the empirical findings are presented. First, a detailed analysis of the influence of 
performance information in the revisions investigated is presented. Second, the theoretical 
framework is applied to explain the observed differences. The conclusion summarizes the 
main findings and discusses the strengths of the proposed theoretical framework. 
 
Defining Performance Information as Systematic Evidence on ‘what works’ 
This analysis focuses on performance information defined as systematic evidence about the 
consequences of a public intervention measured in a systematic and transparent way. Such 
information can be labelled as research-based or scientific evidence in contrast to anecdotic 
evidence. There is no consensus about what counts a sound evidence for decision making 
within the evidence-based policy movement (Donaldson et al. 2009). The core issue of this 
debate deals with the questions what types of studies are capable of determining causality and 
which methods are capable of demonstrating scientific rigor. The definition of performance 
information used in this analysis applies no rigorous standard of scientific quality. From the 
methodological point of view, the definition only requires that the evidence is collected and 
analysed in a systematic and transparent way. Additionally, the definition includes two 
restrictions: The evidence must have been accessible for the involved actors and produced in 
the period after the enactment of the regulation under revision and prior to the adoption of the 
revised regulation. In contrast, the definition does not apply any restriction concerning the 
source of the evidence: It can be commissioned and produced by state actors as well as other 
public or private actors and can be Swiss specific or related to other countries.1
                                                 
1  This definition allows to trace the influence of subgroups of performance information, for instance with 
respect to producers (public administration, academic expert, interest organization, etc.) or the origins (Swiss 
specific or related to other jurisdiction). However, in this paper such a detailed analysis is not provided. 
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Performance (‘what works’) refers to the causal framework (set of hypotheses) inherent, 
either explicitly or implicitly, in every policy: If the government undertakes a set of actions, a 
set of effects are likely to occur. In policy analysis and evaluation, the concept of the chain of 
effects (e.g. Chen 1990) is broadly used to systematize and map the causal framework of a 
policy measure. It suggests mapping policy performance on three interdependent levels: 
output, outcome and impact. The output represents the products and services of a policy 
measure and creates a direct relationship between the public authority in charge and the 
addressees of the policy measure. The addresses involve all actors whose behaviours are 
relevant to the problem in question. Outcome refers to the effects the policy measure has on 
the direct addresses. The policy addresses can react as expected, not react at all or even react 
in a non-intended manner. Finally, impact encompasses all intended or non-intended effects 
of a policy measure in the society and shows if the policy leads to an improvement of the 
problem or not. Thus, in this paper performance information refers to investigations dealing 
with one or several relationships between these three levels of effects. 
In Figure 1, the concept of the chain of effects is illustrated by an example of the cases 
investigated, namely the traffic safety measure ‘legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) 
limit’.2 The federal law on the BAC limit as well as implementation activities such as a 
national information campaign constitute the policy output at the federal level. In 
Switzerland, the cantons are responsible to control compliance and to sanction offences 
against traffic safety legislations (output at the cantonal level).3 Performance information 
about this policy measure investigates, for instance, if a reduction of the legal limit leads to 
less alcohol-impaired driving, and thereby reduces alcohol-related traffic fatalities. Further, 
performance information can also deal with non-intended effects: The legislative leeway with 
respect to the duration of administrative licences suspension for offences could lead to the 
non-intended output respectively impact of unequal sanctions for the same offences in the 
different cantons. It can also be of interest to create performance information regarding the 
non-intended outcome of lower turnovers in bars and restaurants feared by the concerned 
industry. 
                                                 
2  The chain of effects for the policy measure is based on a document analysis and contains central expectations 
put forward by the involved actors as well as the effects investigated by existing performance information. 
3  Cantons have not only implementation competencies but also programming competencies in the application 
of the federal laws. In other words, the chain of effects of a federal policy implemented in a federalist context 
has a multilevel structure with respect to public services and products provided at the national and cantonal 
levels (see also Sager/Rüefli 2005: 110). 
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Figure 1: Chain of effects of the policy measure ‘blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit’ 
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Tracing the Influence of Performance Information: A Pragmatic Approach 
This analysis aims to trace the extent to which legislative policy-making dealing with a 
revision of a policy measure is influenced by performance information. To trace the influence 
of performance information, we first identified all existing performance information 
following the proposed definition. The influence of performance information is a cognitive 
phenomenon that can not be observed and measured directly. In the research on evaluation 
utilization, we find various approaches how to conceptualize and measure ‘utilization’4 or 
‘influence’5 of research-based information on policy-making. In policy analysis, there is also 
no common approach how to deal with the influence of ideas or how to conceptualize 
learning (Howlett and Ramesh 2003, Radaelli 1995). 
This study proposes a pragmatic approach to cope with the cognitive phenomenon. It assumes 
that any influence of systematic evidence including performance information originates from 
the information processing behaviour of the involved actors (see Mark and Henry 2004). With 
the notion of involved actors a comprehensive approach is followed including not only 
                                                 
4  For syntheses of ‘utilization research’ see for instance Shulha and Cousins 1997; Weiss 1998; Vedung 1997, 
for empirical studies Amara et al. 2004; Weiss et al. 2005. 
5  Kirkhart (2000) and Mark and Henry (2004) prefer the term ‘influence’ to cope with the effects of evaluations 
because ‘utilization’ and ‘use’ suggest purposeful action, whereas effects of evaluations are more diffuse. 
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members of the government and the parliament but also public servants, interest groups, and 
non-governmental organisations. Actors’ positions stated in documents and interviews were 
analyzed if they refer to performance information. Furthermore, the analysis takes into 
account that performance information is only one type of relevant information and knowledge 
available to the involved actors and involved actors might pay attention to many things other 
than performance information; e.g. systematic evidence on the size or causes of the problem, 
the costs of change, claims of powerful interest groups (Webber 1991; Davies et al. 2005). 
In utilization research but especially in policy theory, the crucial question is whether 
performance information is used to learn and improve a policy solution, or (only) used to 
pursue self-interests and thereby, opportunistically used to legitimize a decision taken on 
other grounds (see for instance Albaek 1995, Weiss 1999). The concept of evidence-based 
policy emphasizes the first intent and postulates the maxim to base political decisions on 
knowledge about what type of efforts work and with which means. In its strict sense, this 
concept follows the logic of rational decision making (Parsons 2002; Sanderson 2002). 
Policy-makers are supposed to specify the goals, draw attention to the alternative ways in 
which the goals can be achieved, evaluate the consequences of the alternatives, and select the 
alternative that maximizes the benefit. However, since the 1960s various studies have shown 
that instrumental utilization rarely occurs in reality and covers only a very specific aspect of 
the phenomenon (for a syntheses see Shulha and Cousins 1997). 
To deal with this question, this study argues that if performance information was present in an 
early stage of the revision process, it can be assumed that performance information was 
considered with the aim to improve a policy measure, and not only to legitimize an 
adaptation. Furthermore, the analysis takes into account how the involved actors describe the 
influence of performance information in the revision processes. 
 
Conditions Shaping the Role of Performance Information: An Integrative Framework 
Neither the literature about evaluation utilization, nor the literature concerned with ideas and 
policy learning provides us with a comprehensive and widely accepted theoretical framework 
to explain the role of research-based information in policy-making (Webber 1991; Bennett 
and Howlett 1992; Mark and Henry 2004, James and Jorgensen 2009). This study proposes an 
integrative framework and argues that the role of performance information in policy-making 
is shaped by the processes of creation and diffusion of such information as well as the 
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political context. This framework is inspired by the idea of a flow of information taking place 
in a political context. In the following sections, the conditions are introduced in more detailes. 
Characteristics of Existing Performance Information 
The literature on evaluation utilization emphasizes that the characteristics of a study and its 
production context affects the attention, rejection or acceptance by the users (Weiss and 
Bucuvalas 1980). First of all, performance information should be accessible and well-time to 
influence policy-making. Further, we can argue that performance information becomes more 
relevant to find the ‘best’ policy and more powerful to gain support if findings are consistent 
and leave little room for uncertainty (Esterling 2004; Gormley 2007). 
Whether or not performance information is considered, crucially depends on how it is 
perceived by potential users. Empirical studies, mainly focussing on civil servants, show that 
users consider the quality of an evaluation and its relevance to their needs. Carol Weiss and 
Michael J. Bucuvalas (1980) showed that the decision-makers – US officials in federal, state 
and local mental health agencies – use two frames of references. On the one hand, the truth-
test refers to research quality and conformity to user expectation. On the other hand, the 
utility-test refers to the action orientation of the study and its challenge to status quo. Thereby, 
the quality of an evaluation has the highest salience and Weiss and Bucuvalas assume: 
“Research quality, thus not only assures decision-makers that they are basing a case on good 
evidence but also serves the political function of protecting the case from methodologically 
based criticism.” (ibid. 307). These considerations can be summarized by the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 
If performance information is timely accessible, consistent and certain, and is perceived 
as credible, performance information will be more influential in the revision process. 
 
Diffusion of Systematic Evidence by Mass Media 
In the literature of evaluation utilization it is often postulated that media attention enhance the 
influence of evaluations in policy-making (Weiss 1999; Mark and Henry 2004; Weiss et al. 
2005). It is argued that media coverage on evaluations can affect the behaviour of involved 
actors by supplying them with new evidence. We propose to differentiate this argument and 
postulate that for civil servant of the federal administration, specialized agency or interest 
groups mass media might not be an important information channel because they have 
privileged access to performance information by other more direct channels. In contrast, 
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parliamentarians seem to be more dependent on mass media. Further, it is also convincing to 
postulate that media reports, the publicity especially of problematic performance, can increase 
the pressure on civil servants and elected politicians to consider certain performance 
information (Weiss et al. 2005, 24). They have to handle the risk of being blamed in the 
future to have neglected the performance information diffused by the mass media. Thus, 
media can enforce the use of performance information not only by its role as an information 
channel but also by its role as a trigger. Further support for the relevance of these hypotheses 
can be derived from the literature on agenda setting and the concept of media framing 
(Gamson et al. 1992). 
Hypothesis 2 
If performance information is diffused by mass media, performance information will be 
more influential in the revision process. 
 
Political Context 
Various contextual factors are addressed in policy research to influence the nature of policy-
making and therewith also the role of cognitive aspects (see for instance Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993; Radaelli 1995; Weiss 1999). This study proposes to attribute the factors to the 
following categories: the institutional setting, and the characteristics of the policy field and 
policy measures. 
The institutional setting refers to the structure of the decision arena of the policy-making 
process. Creating, selecting and interpreting performance information involves financial, 
personal and organizational resource. Thus, the role of performance information depends on 
the existing capacities to process research-based knowledge. The capacities of the 
administration unit in charge are especially crucial because of its eminent role in the 
legislative process. The administration is the instance that usually prepares legislative acts and 
formulates the legal texts for the government and the parliament. In Switzerland, the pre-
parliamentary phase is considered to be decisive for the policy content: A majority of the 
decrees passed the parliament without any substantial changes (Sciarini 2002). In policy 
research ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas 1992) or ‘policy fora’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993) that bring together analysts and officials on a regular basis are considered to enhance 
the influence of cognitive aspects in policy-making. Civil servants and experts have a 
privileged access to performance information and are specialists in their field whereas 
members of the parliament are generalists and are too short on time to do the research and 
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analysis to discover firsthand the political meaning of available research. Based on these 
considerations, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
Hypothesis 3a 
If an evidence-oriented administration supported by an expert group plays a decisive role 
in an early stage of the revision process, performance information will be more 
influential in the revision process. 
 
Utilization research (Amara, Ouimet and Landry 2004) and policy theory (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1993) argue that the role of performance information is shaped by the 
characteristics of the policy field respectively the policy measure. Policy fields differ with 
respect to their affinity to technology and natural sciences. In fields with a high affinity to 
technology, such as traffic policy, we expect that policy-making is more shaped by technical 
considerations, and thereby more oriented both, towards generation and utilization of 
performance information. In contrast, in socio-political fields with an ideological and 
emotional connotation, such as migration policy, performance information is expected to be 
less influential. 
In literature several characteristics of the policy measure are emphasized to shape the role of 
performance information (Rose 1993, 118-42; Weiss 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
Most prominent are the level of conflict about the revision, the scale of change and the 
inclusiveness and intrusiveness of a policy measure. The underlying, common argument of 
these three dimensions is that they might lead to an involvement of lot of actors (interests) 
and to a polarization of the issues. If there are many interests present and a the revision is 
dominated by a polarization respectively an intense conflict, the influence of performance 
information is supposed to be rather marginal or restricted to legitimise a decision. In 
contrast, if a consensual or collaborative context is present, learning from systematic evidence 
is more likely to occur (Weible and Sabatier 2009). Additionally, intrusiveness and 
inclusiveness (Linder and Peters 1989: 40) focus on the design of a policy measure. Whereas 
intrusiveness a policy measure refers to the degree of intrusion into private affairs, 
inclusiveness describes the range of a policy measure in a horizontal sense, i.e. the scope of 
addressees. We argue that in a revision of a highly intrusive and inclusive policy measure, 
personal experiences of the politicians and values about the way of life may play a more 
important role than performance information. 
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Hypothesis 3b 
The degree of the policy field’s affinity to technology, the scale of change, the 
inclusiveness and intrusiveness of a policy measure, as well as the level of conflict about 
the revision will affect the role of performance information in the revision process. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
The empirical analysis is based on a comparative case study approach (Yin 2003). A case is 
defined by a revision process of a policy measure. A policy measure consists of a goal and set 
of activities (instruments) aiming to influence a specific target population in the desired way. 
Hence, a policy measure is thought to operate through a set of causal beliefs (hypotheses) and 
can be illustrated by a single ‘chain of effects’ as illustrated by Figure 1 on page 5. The 
empirical analysis concentrates on policy measures because performance information defined 
as systematic evidence on ‘what works with whom, how and why’ is most precise if it refers 
to a single policy measure. It is obvious, that severer administrative sanctions for repeat 
offenders of traffic rules and the introduction of a two-phase driver-training licensing systems 
call for different performance information. A decision about a single policy measure is 
influenced by other decisions taking place in the same revision process. Therefore an 
embedded case study approach seems to be most appropriate (Yin 2003). 
A total of twelve case studies have been conducted to apply and test the integrative 
framework. As hypothesis 3b postulates that the policy field shapes the role of performance 
information in policy-making, three different policy fields with different affinities to 
technology respectively ideology were selected: Traffic safety with a high affinity to 
technology, asylum policy with a high ideological and emotional connotation and health 
policy as an intermediate field with no clear anticipation. Health policy was further selected 
because the concept of ‘evidence-based policy’ stemmed from the concepts of ‘evidence-
based medicine’ and therefore, it is reasonable to expect efforts to realize evidence-based 
policy in this field. Within each policy field, the two most recent terminated legislative 
revisions that have attracted some media attention have been selected. If the policy revision 
comprised more than one policy measure, up to three policy measures were selected to cover 
the revision more profoundly. Table 1 gives an overview of the selected policy measures. 
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Table 1: Selected cases of revisions of policy measures 
 Traffic safety policy measures Revision, Year of final decision 
1 Speed limitation in urban areas Ordinance ‘30 kph Zones’, 2001 
2 Cascade system: Stiffer administrative sanctions for repeat offenders 
3 Introduction of a two-phase driver-training licensing system 
4 Reduction of the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit to 0,05 % 
Law on Road Traffic, 2001 
 
Ordinance on BAC limit, 2003 
 Health policy measures  
5 2nd Extension of the ‘moratorium’ for new medical services providers Law on Sickness Insurance, 2008
6 Heroin-assisted treatment 
7 Stiffer penalties for supplying drugs to minors especially in the 
neighbourhoods of schools 
8 Authority to advice at-risk (young) people to specialized agencies 
Law on Narcotics and Psychotro-
pic substances, 2008 
 Asylum policy measures  
9 Social assistance exclusion of all asylum seekers whose applications were 
not considered for formal reason (non-entry decision). 
10 More severe coercive measures (extended detention pending removal) 
Austerity Program, 2003 
11 Social assistance exclusion of all rejected asylum seekers 
12 More severe coercive measures (e.g. longer detention duration) 
Law on Asylum, 2005 
 
The data collection and analysis was organized and guided by a case study protocol (Yin 
2003). Three methods of data collection were applied: media content analysis, document 
analysis and expert interviews. Media content analysis was used to measure the condition 
‘diffusion of performance information by mass media’. All articles of the three biggest Swiss 
newspapers dealing with the twelve policy measures were selected and coded if they refer to 
performance information.6 Document analysis included the study of three different types of 
documents. First, documents containing performance information about the selected policy 
measures were identified and analysed to answer the questions what kind of systematic was 
available, when and produced by whom. Second, the revision processes were reconstructed by 
the analysis of documents containing information about the cases including secondary 
literature and grey literature. Third, all references to performance information in policy 
documents containing actor’s position, such as actors’ responses in official consultations or 
minutes of parliamentary debates, were coded to see whether involved actors did cite 
performance information. Finally, 45 interviews with key actors involved in the revision 
processes were conducted. Interviews covered the following four groups of actors: Civil 
servants, producers of performance information or researchers, non-governmental organi-
                                                 
6  The media content analysis was conducted by my colleague Mirella Schütz, a scholar of mass communication 
and media research. She kindly provided us the data for this analysis. 
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zations and parliamentarians who were members of the committees in charge of the 
revisions.7
 
The Influence of Performance Information in Legislative Revisions 
The influence of performance information in the legislative revisions of the twelve selected 
policy measures varied considerably: In seven cases performance information had an 
influence, in two cases performance information was present, but not influential, and in three 
cases, performance information was not at all present (see Table 2).  
Table 2: The role of performance information (PI) in the revisions of the twelve policy measures 
Policy measure Reference in 
official policy 
documents* 
Pre-parliamentary 
phase 
Parliamentary 
phase 
Overall 
influence 
Speed limitation in urban areas  some high -- high 
Cascade system no low not present low 
Two-phase driver-training system few moderate not present moderate 
BAC limit  few moderate present moderate 
Moratorium for new services providers no low** not present no influence 
Heroin-assisted treatment few high present high 
Authority to advice at-risk people no not present not present not present 
Penalties ‘supplying drugs to minors’ no not present not present not present 
Social assistance exclusion no low present low 
Coercive measures I no not present not present not present 
Extended social assistance exclusions no low present low 
Coercive measures II no low present no influence 
*Official policy documents: Drafts of the legal text, messages of the Federal Council sent out for consultation 
and sent to the parliament. 
**In this case there was no per-parliamentary phase. 
Operationalization of the level of influence: not present = no traces of PI neither in interviews nor in official 
documents; no influence = interviewees attributed no influence to PI, and the revision is not consistent with the 
main findings of the PI; low influence = interviewees attributed only low influence to PI, no references to PI in 
official policy documents; moderate influence = interviewees attributed some influence to PI, few references to 
PI in official policy documents; high influence = interviewees attributed high influence to PI, few/some referen-
ces to PI in official policy documents. The analysis of the parliamentary phase is based mainly on the content 
analysis of the minutes of the corresponding debates and a few interviews. Therefore, we differentiated only 
between present = references to PI in the minutes/interviews and not present = no references to PI/interviews. 
As postulated, revision processes of traffic safety policy measures seem to be most evidence-
based whereas performance information played no crucial role in asylum policy revisions. For 
health policy, the findings are very diverse and evidence-based policy-making seems to be 
rather exceptional as observed only in one case, though in this case performance information 
                                                 
7  The composition of interviewees is displayed in Table 7 in the appendix. 
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played a significant role. In the following sections, the findings summarized in Table 2 are 
further explained by a presentation of the rationales of the revision processes. 
Visible Attempts of Evidence-Based Policy-Making in the Field of Traffic Safety:  
At the beginning of the 21st century, traffic safety policy was revised in Switzerland after 
more than a decade without major changes of the legislation. On the one hand, the Federal 
Ordinance about Zone Signposting in Residential Areas (‘30 kph zones’) was revised to 
facilitate the implementation. On the other hand, the Federal Law on Road Traffic was 
adapted to improve traffic safety through progressively stiffer administrative sanctions for 
repeat offenders (‘cascade system’), the introduction of a two-phase driver-training licensing 
system and the reduction of the legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit to 0,05 percent.  
The revision of the ‘30 kph zones’ adopted in 2001 by the Federal Council comes very close 
to an ideal of evidence-based policy-making: Performance information about the efficiency 
and effectiveness of such zones was very present in the policy documents of the revision and 
interviewees emphasized the relevance of such information. For instance, the policy 
document announcing the revision,8 mentions several studies and refers to the main findings 
of the existing performance information. The members of the working group appointed by the 
Federal Roads Office to support the revision and representing central actors of the policy field 
had also knowledge of the performance information not only from Switzerland but also from 
other countries. Interview statements indicate that performance information showing how 
such zones can be efficiently and effectively implemented was used to improve the ordinance. 
In the revision of the Federal Law on Road Traffic, the influence of performance information 
was less significant and varies between the three adapted measures (see Table 2). Policy 
documents contain only few explicit, very incomplete references to performance information. 
In general, document analysis and interview statements indicate that not performance 
information but rather systematic evidence about the problems was considered as the most 
important findings in this revision process. In the case of the cascade system, interviewees 
had knowledge of existing performance information, but pointed out that this knowledge was 
not very influential for the concrete designing of the cascade system.9 The cascade system 
was defined by the Inter-Cantonal Conference for Administrative Sanctions and primarily 
                                                 
8  Message of the Federal Council, March 13, 2000 about the popular initiative ‘Strassen für alle’ (BBl 2000 
2887). 
9  The introduction of a cascade system included the definition of nationwide minimal sanctions and a stepwise 
increase of the minimal sanctions for repeat offenders. 
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based on cantonal experiences with license suspension. The designing of the two-phase driver 
training system was inspired by performance information form other jurisdiction (mainly 
from the U.S.A. and New Zealand) and new information produced during the process. 
Interview statements indicate that the existing systems were estimated as not transferable to 
Switzerland. The stepwise removal of restrictions such as night curfew or lower BAC limit 
for new drivers was considered as not compatible with the Swiss tradition. Therefore, a new 
model with a provisional licence for three years combined with a mandatory advanced 
education in the second phase was elaborated including a study that investigated the 
practicability and acceptance of an advanced education by the participants (Bächli-Biétry 
1998). The interviewees considered this study as useful to define but also to legitimize the 
advanced education. Finally, performance information played a moderate role in the case of 
the reduction of the BAC limit. Interviewees pointed out, that since years or even decades, 
traffic safety experts agreed that the lowering to 0,05 percent is empirically justified based on 
performance information but also on findings from traffic medicine. Interviewees attributed 
only moderate significance to performance information due to the lack of comprehensive 
European or even Swiss findings. In the parliamentary process, the parliamentarians’ attention 
was concentrated on the reduction of the legal BAC limit, the two other measures passed 
without an intense debate. The parliamentary debate about the BAC limit was rather driven by 
emotions and personal experiences than by performance information. 
Evidence-based Policy-Making as Exception in the Field of Health Policy? 
Although evidence-based policy-making originated from ‘evidence-based medicine’, 
performance information played only in one cases a significant role. However, the analysis 
covers only four policy measures adapted in two revisions, namely the revisions of the Law 
on Narcotics 2008 and of the Law on Sickness Insurance 2008. Furthermore, health policy is 
a broad field and the analysis could differentiate between particular subfields such as drug 
policy or health service provision. Our analysis shows that at least in the subfield of drug 
policy, both extreme – significant influence and no influence – can be observed (see Table 2). 
The Federal Law on Narcotics (FLN) in force since 1975 was finally revised by the Federal 
Parliament on the 20th March 2008 after a long revision process including a failed revision 
proposed by the Federal Council. The successful revision of 2008 is based on a parliamentary 
initiative that took up the uncontested issues of the failed proposal aiming to institutionalize 
the so called ‘four pillar drug policy’ including harm reduction, in addition to the traditional 
elements of prevention, treatment and law enforcement. Our analysis focuses on the timely 
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unlimited institutionalization of heroin-assisted treatment for chronic addicts resistant to other 
treatments and on the measures aiming to improve the protection of juveniles from illicit 
drugs. The legal institutionalization of heroin-assisted treatment is considered as an 
exceptional example of evidence-based policy-making. Based on the FLN of 1975, the 
Federal Council could only introduce heroin-assisted treatment in form of a research trial in 
1994. The trial was launched based on a review of all previous scientific experience with 
heroin and morphine prescribing (Mino 1990). An independent group of researcher was in 
charge of the evaluation and accompanied by an external scientific board to review and 
follow-up the scientific process (Rihs-Middle et al. 2002). Interviewees with a scientific 
background and from the Federal Commission for Drug Issues commended this evidence-
based approach pursued by the Federal Office of Public Health. The positive effects on 
patients’ as well as the reduction of drug-related delinquency and of the nuisance from open 
drug scenes are present in the documents and the interviews. Nevertheless, there are only few 
explicit references to studies in official documents, in the parliamentary debate as well as in 
interviews with parliamentarians. Interview statements indicate that the opinions were formed 
prior to the revision of the FLN that took place after more than a decade of experiences with 
heroin-assisted treatment and after popular votes on timely restricted heroin-treatment at the 
national and cantonal level. By the time of the revision, opposition against the heroin-assisted 
treatment was linked to the strong ideological position of a drug free society and abstinence 
only policy. 
The revision of the youth protection measures included the introduction of severer penalties 
for supplying drugs to minors especially around schools and the authority to advice 
(Gefährdungsmeldung) at-risk people to specialized institutions was extended to professionals 
from the educational, social, justice and police sectors. Document analysis and interview 
statements consistently show that performance information was not present in the revision 
process. All interviewees including parliamentarians, civil servants, researchers and members 
of the Federal Commission for Drug Issues pointed out that the adaptation of youth protection 
measures within this revision was clearly symbolic and expectations about the effects of these 
changes in legislations were low. There was an agreement that youth protection should be 
improved, and that an improvement would have been also possible based on the existing law. 
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In the case of the second prolongation10 of the so called moratorium on the authorizations of 
new medical surgeries that provide outpatient services which are reimbursed under 
compulsory sickness insurance, the revision was dominated by political and economic 
interests as well as anecdotic cantonal evidence and assumptions about the effects of the 
moratorium. Interview statements show that civil servants and representatives of interest 
groups had knowledge of the existing performance information, but they emphasized that it 
was not influential. Furthermore, some interviewees pointed out, that an additional evaluation 
was planned by the Federal Office of Public Health, but not realized because of strategic and 
political considerations. The decision of the prolongation was shaped by the agreement that 
this measure is only a timely limited ‘emergency’ solution till a follow-up solution is 
elaborated and accepted. The following interview quotes illustrate the bargaining situation:  
“The moratorium is the pledge.” (NGO, translated by the author)  
“It is a political measure. It is not about facts and figures, but about the politics of power. In 
the context, where the Federal Council contrasts the moratorium of new medical service 
providers with the abolishment of mandatory contracting, an investment in evidence would 
politically not have paid off.” (NGO, translated by the author). 
Ideological Policy-Making in the Field of Asylum Policy? 
Swiss asylum policy is characterized by intensive reform activities. Since its adoption in 
1979, the Federal Law on Asylum (FLA) was revised on average every three years. Thus, the 
possibilities of feedback loops about the implementation of the revised policy solutions were 
already timely restricted. The following analysis concentrates on the Austerity Program 2003 
(AP 2003) and the revision of the FLA in 2005. These two revision processes overlap each 
other because the revision of the FLA started already in 1999. The analysis focuses on two 
policy measures adapted in both revisions: The coercive measures and the social assistance 
exclusion of rejected asylum seekers. 
The coercive measures11 mainly consisting of imprisoning aliens respectively rejected asylum 
seekers who refuse to follow orders to leave Switzerland were introduced in 1995 to improve 
the alien removal policy. In 2003, the reasons for detention pending deportation 
(‘Ausschaffungshaft’) were amended to provide the cantonal authorities with better 
                                                 
10  The moratorium was introduced in July 2002 on the basis of Art. 55a of the Federal Law on Sickness 
Insurance (SR 823.10) for a period of three years and extended in July 2005 for further three years. The 
moratorium was introduced to restrict the potential flow of physicians from the EU after the enactment of the 
bilateral agreements with the EU. The moratorium should also contribute to a stabilization of the increase 
rate of the expenditure of the sickness insurance based on the assumption of a supply-induced demand. 
11  ‘Coercive measures’, Swiss Law on the Residence and Settlement of Foreign Nationals (SR 142.20). 
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instruments to carry out deportations. Interview statements and document analysis 
consistently show that performance information was not present in this revision process. In 
2005, the revision included major changes such as the doubling of the maximal duration from 
nine to eighteen months for detention pending deportation and the introduction of a new form 
of detention to enforce cooperation (‘Durchsetzungshaft’). Interviewees from the federal 
administration as well as other actors pointed out, that these modifications were not based on 
performance information but on political ideas of the new head of the Federal Department of 
Justice and Police.12 The Federal Councillor Christoph Blocher argued in the parliamentary 
debate that cantonal authorities and professionals did request stricter coercive measures. He 
referred to anecdotic evidence gathered by his visits and discussions with professionals 
working in detention facilities. In the last stage of the revision, when the two Chambers of the 
Federal Parliament sorted their differences out, one evaluation of the Parliamentary 
Administration Control (2005) obtained much attention and was presented by the author in 
several parliamentary committees. Parliamentarians against stricter coercive measures used 
this evaluation as a proof that stricter coercive measures do not efficiently and effectively 
guarantee successful deportations in the asylum sector. Parliamentarians in favour of the 
revision emphasized mainly shortcomings of the evaluation. The following interview quotes 
illustrate how two members of the parliamentarian committee perceived the debate:  
“Ideological considerations are often more important and you defy the studies and expertises.” 
(Political Institutions Committee of the Council of States, translated by the author).  
“I have never experienced such a debate before. […] The liberal-conservative members did not 
discuss the Asylum Law, they just raised their hands.” (Political Institutions Committee of the 
Council of States, translated by the author). 
Thus performance information was not influential or even disregarded in the decision to adapt 
the coercive measures within the revision of the FLA in 2005.  
The introduction of the so called ‘social benefit stop’ (Sozialhilfestopp) that excluded asylum 
seekers whose applications was not admitted to the asylum procedures (non-entry decisions) 
from social assistance is considered by the involved actors as paradigm change. Already 
before the Austerity Program 2003 (AP 2003), the Federal Council elaborated a revision of 
the social assistance system of the asylum sector,13 but a social assistance exclusion of certain 
                                                 
12  The Federal Councillor Christoph Blocher did take over the department the 1st of January 2004, after his 
party, the Swiss People’s Party won the elections in 2003. A stricter asylum policy was a core issue of their 
successful election campaign.  
13  Message of the Federal Council about the Revision of the Law on Asylum, September 4, 2002. 
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groups dependent on the outcome of their asylum procedure was a ‘taboo’. The asylum sector 
had to contribute 140 mio. CHF to the AP 2003. Document analysis and interviews show, that 
the Federal Office for Refugees proposed the system change based on existing performance 
information about the system in place indicating that no further cost reduction was possible 
within the existing system. However, they did not refer to performance information about the 
proposed solution. They referred to statistical data, their professional experiences and 
international exchanges especially with the Netherlands that had already introduced such a 
system. Furthermore, they pointed out that this policy change was strongly linked to the 
normative question, if a person who does not follow the orders to leave Switzerland should be 
eligible for ordinary social benefits. In the policy documents as well as in the parliamentary 
debate, mainly non-intended negative effects were discussed and the necessity to monitor the 
consequences of the system change was stipulated in the law.14 Interviews clearly show that 
the ‘monitoring’ was proposed to build confidence and find a compromise. Thus, not existing 
performance information was influential but rather the strategic promise to monitor and adapt 
the system if necessarily. 
In 2005, the social assistance exclusion was extended to all asylum seekers whose 
applications had been rejected. This extension was explicitly not part of the AP 2003, in 
contrast, the system change should first be monitored for at least three years and thereafter, an 
extension should be discussed based on the findings of the monitoring. This fact was 
emphasized by the opponents of the extension. First monitoring reports from the Federal 
Office in charge as well as from the main non-governmental organization, the Swiss Refugee 
Council, about the implementation of the social assistance exclusion of all asylum seekers 
with a non-entry decision were present in the parliamentary debate. However, most 
interviewees emphasized that these reports did not have great influence on the decision to 
extend the exclusion of social assistance. In contrast, the debate was primarily shaped by 
ideological and normative arguments. 
 
The Power of Strong Performance Information 
To identify the existing performance information, we conducted an electronic research 
including library catalogues, data bases as well as internet sites of research institutions and of 
actors of the respective policy fields. In total, we identified 174 studies; 64 (37%) contained 
                                                 
14  Federal Law on the Austerity Program 2003, December 19, 2003, SR 142.31. 
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Swiss specific performance information and 110 (63%) contained performance information 
from other jurisdictions. Table 3 shows that the number of studies about the individual policy 
measures varies considerably, both for Swiss specific and for other information. Furthermore, 
the number of studies commissioned by Swiss authorities varies from one to fourteen (see 
Table 3).15 To understand the Swiss specific context, it is important to know, that although 
the Swiss Constitution includes a general evaluation clause in Article 170 since 1999,16 the 
federal administration has no common strategy about the production of performance 
information (Widmer and Neuenschwander 2004). 
Further, Table 3 displays the level of consistency, uncertainty and credibility and in its ninth 
column the characteristics of existing performance information are subsumed in an ordinal 
number. The level of consistency indicates on the one hand, if the findings of the different 
studies are corresponding with each other. On the other hand, the level of consistency also 
reflects the ambiguity of competing expectations about (different) effects of a policy measure 
and how to measure, analyse and weight the different dimensions of the policy effectiveness. 
 
15  Explanations for the differences are manifold and also investigated by our research project (Zollinger 2009). 
16  Art. 170 requires the Federal Parliament to ensure that the effectiveness of federal measures is investigated. 
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Table 3: The characteristics of existing performance information (PI) 
Policy measure Period PI* Swiss PI commissio-
ned by Swiss 
authorities 
Level of 
consistency 
Level of 
uncertainty 
Level of 
credibility 
Total factors 
enhancing the 
influence 
Overall 
influence of 
PI 
Support  
for H1 
Speed limitation in urban areas 1989 – 01 22 15 (73%) 9 high        (1) low         (1) high           (1) 3 high yes 
Cascade system 1990 – 01 14 1 (7%) 0 high        (1) moderate (0) moderate   (0) 1 low no 
Two-phase driver-training system 1990 – 01 30 5 (17%) 4 high        (1) high       (-1) no issue     (0) 0 moderate yes 
BAC limit 1980 – 03 46 3 (7%) 3 high        (1) moderate (0) contended (-1) 0 moderate yes 
Moratorium for new services providers 2001 – 08 5 5 (100%) 2 moderate (0) high       (-1) no issue     (0) - 1 no influence yes 
Heroin-assisted treatment 1998 – 08 26 19 (73%) 14 high        (1) low         (1) high           (1) 3 high yes 
Authority to advice at-risk people 1998 – 08 0 0 0 −            (-1) −            (-1) −               (-1) - 3 not present yes 
Penalties ‘supplying drugs to minors’ 1998 – 08 0 0 0 −            (-1) −            (-1) −               (-1) - 3 not present yes 
Social assistance exclusion 1999 – 03 7 4 (43%) 3 moderate (0) high       (-1) contended (-1) - 2 low yes 
Coercive measures I 1994 – 03 8 2 (25%) 1 moderate (0) high       (-1) contended (-1) - 2 not present yes 
Extended social assistance exclusion 2004 – 05 8 5 (63%) 3 low        (-1) high       (-1) contended (-1) - 3 low yes 
Coercive measures II 2004 – 05 8 5 (63%) 4 moderate (0) high       (-1) contended (-1) - 2 no influence yes 
* We only included, when ever it was possible, the final report of a study and not intermediate reports or different articles presenting the main results of the study. 
H1 Hypotheses 1: If performance information is timely available, consistent and certain, and is perceived as credible, performance information will be more influential in 
policy-making. 
Operationalization: The findings of the different studies were not weighted according their quality to measure their consistency, uncertainty, and credibility 
Level of consistency: low = few findings of the different studies are consistent; moderate = majority of the findings of the different studies are consistent; high = nearly all 
findings of the different studies are consistent. 
Level of uncertainty: low = few causal relations of the chain of effects are investigated by studies, effects are highly context dependent; moderate = some causal relations of the 
chain of effects are investigated by studies, moderate context dependences; high = main relations of the chain of effects are investigated by several studies, effects are not bee 
highly context dependent. 
Level of credibility as estimated by the involved actors in interviews and documents; no issue = the question of credibility was not important because performance information 
was considered as not relevant for other reasons (transferability, lack of new, comprehensive findings, not timely enough). 
The level of uncertainty indicates on the one hand, how many of the causal relationships of 
the chain of effects are covered by the performance information and on the other hand, how 
context dependent the effects of a policy measures are. Finally the level of credibility 
indicates how the involved actors estimated the trustworthiness of the existing performance 
information. 
If the characteristics of the existing performance information are consolidated to one 
condition, hypothesis 1 postulating that strength of the existing performance information 
shapes the influence of such information in legislative revisions is confirmed for eleven out of 
twelve cases (see Table 3, last three columns). In the case of the ‘cascade system’, the 
influence of performance information in the revision was low although existing performance 
information was quite strong. For this case, we found only one study about Switzerland 
calculating the cost-benefit ratios of a cascade systems (Eckhardt and Seitz 1998) and this 
study was not perceived as credible: 
“We did not emphasize this prognosis of the Swiss Accident Council. That is reading in tea 
leaves. Therefore, we did not introduce this argument in the parliamentary debate.” (Federal 
administration, translated by the author). 
In contrast, the credibility of the findings about other jurisdictions, mainly form the U.S.A., 
was not contested by the involved actors. Performance information about administrative 
sanctions shows that licences suspension is more effective than jail or fine alone and reduces 
recidivism among first and repeat offenders (for instance Mann et al. 1991). However, the 
findings are not totally consistent concerning the magnitude of the effects; this applies 
especially to the effects of progressively stiffer sanctions on multiple offenders. Thus, there 
are uncertainties about the most effective combinations of sanctions and no clear 
recommendations how the sanction systems should concretely be designed (categorizations of 
offences and respective sanction durations). These remarks illustrate that existing 
performance information was only limited applicable to design a sanction system. However, 
interview statements and document analysis indicate, that involved actors did not 
(systematically) delve into the existing performance information. 
According to the hypothesis 1, the strongest performance information played the most 
significant role in legislative revisions, namely in the cases of ‘speed limitation in urban 
areas’ and ‘heroin-assisted treatment’ (see Table 3). For instance, in the case of the ‘heroin-
assisted treatment’, all findings document the feasibility of the treatment, the positive changes 
in patients, the safety of medication and the absence of major negative events. Continued 
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research covered among other issues the positive long-term effects for the patients in heroin-
assisted treatment (Güttinger et al. 2003) and the reduction of drug-related delinquency in 
cities (Killias et al. 2002). The credibility and acceptability of the findings were further 
increased by publications in peer-reviewed journals. Like the following interview quotation 
shows, even parliamentarian against heroin-assisted treatment did not try to argument against 
the findings, but emphasized that it is not a question of evidence but rather of moral value: 
“We can not celebrate such a success. We think state should intervene earlier and not prescribe 
drugs to addicts.” (Committee of Social Security and Health of the National Council, translated 
by the author) 
In two of the three cases where performance information was not present in the revision 
processes, we did not find performance information too. In the case of ‘coercive measures I’, 
where performance information was not present in the revision process, we identified few 
studies containing performance information. However, the existing studies, mainly about 
other jurisdictions, provided inconsistent results with respect to the deterrence effect of 
coercive measures on potential asylum seekers. Most of the other effects of the coercive 
measures were only covered by a single study. Due to the complexity of the asylum systems, 
the transferability of results from other jurisdictions concerning one element of the system 
was in general highly contested by the interviewees. 
Our results suggest that the strength of the existing performance information is a powerful 
condition to explain the role of performance information in legislative revisions. These 
findings point out that feedback loops – learning across time and space based on systematic 
investigations on ‘what works’ – were not possible in every case because of a lack of strong 
evidence. The marginal influence of performance information in the revisions of the asylum 
policy measures are at least partially explained by the weak existing performance information. 
These findings indicate that socio-political fields with a high ideological and political 
connotation, such as asylum policy, are already not oriented towards the generation of 
performance information (see also Zollinger 2009). The political nature of decision making 
might already hinder the production of performance information and not only the influence of 
existing performance information in decision making. 
To sum up, our analysis demonstrates that the availability of performance information can not 
be taken for granted. However, we would like to point out that the classification of ‘strong’ 
respectively ‘weak’ performance information is of course a question of interpretation and 
weighting. How many studies, what kind of studies or how many intended and non-intended 
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effects have to be investigated that the existing performance information is classified as 
strong evidence? Our analysis focuses on the sum (bases) of performance information without 
weighting studies according their quality and thus, a single very consistent, comprehensive 
and credible study might be obscured by a few not consistent, incomprehensive and not 
credible studies. However, interviews and document analysis did not provide insights 
supporting this problematic. 
 
Diffusion of Performance Information by Mass Media: An Overestimated Condition? 
Preliminary empirical findings about the diffusion of performance information by the three 
biggest Swiss German newspapers are disillusioning: We found few articles referring to the 
identified performance information (see Table 4). References did not have to be a complete 
bibliography, in contrast, we coded articles as ‘diffusion of performance information’ that 
mention a ‘study’ or ‘investigation’ measuring performance information without any further 
details about the author, title etc. Table 4 shows, on the one hand, that diffusion of 
performance information by newspapers was relatively intense in the cases of the two policy 
measures with strong bases of performance information and where performance information 
played a crucial role in policy-making, namely ‘speed limitation in urban areas’ and ‘heroin-
assisted treatment’. Nevertheless, the total number of articles containing a reference is low, 
especially if related to the investigated publication periods that cover a decade or more for 
these two cases. On the other hand, diffusion was also comparably high for two policy 
measures with weak bases of existing performance information and where performance 
information was not influential, namely the ‘extended social assistance exclusion’ and the 
‘coercive measures II’. Those studies referred to in the newspapers, were also present in the 
revision process but not considered as influential. 
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Table 4: The reporting on performance information (PI) in the three biggest Swiss German newspapers  
Policy measure Publication 
period 
Articles about 
the revision 
process 
Articles with 
references to PI 
Speed limitation in urban areas  1989-2001 194  16 (8%) 
Cascade system  0 
Two-phase driver-training system  2 (1%) 
BAC limit  
1990-2003 133 
 5 (4%) 
Moratorium for new medical service providers 2001-2008 92  3 (3%) 
Heroin-assisted treatment  38 (23%) 
Authority to advice at-risk (young) people  0 
Penalties ‘supplying drugs to minors0 
1998-2008 168 
 0 
Social assistance exclusion  0 
Coercive measures I 
2000-2003* 85 
 0 
Extended social assistance exclusion  32 (17%) 
Coercive measures II 
2000-2005 184 
 16 (9%) 
* Additional newspapers were included. 
Data source: Mirella Schütz 2009, amended by the author. 
 
In general, interviewees from the administration, specialized agencies and NGOs pointed out, 
that mass media is not an important channel providing them with new, unknown performance 
information. In contrast, they actively tried to generate media attention for performance 
information. In general, this group of actors did neither observe major distortions of the 
findings nor critical comments on the validity and reliability performance information by 
newspapers. These perceptions are supported by the media content analysis. Interviewees 
from specialized agencies and NGOs emphasized that mass media is an important channel to 
diffuse performance information to parliamentarians: 
“It is much easier to inform parliamentarians about a study or an expertise through mass media 
than by sending it directly to them. They will not read the entire study.” (NGO, translated by the 
author).  
Interview statements from members of the parliamentary committees are more ambiguous. 
However, no interviewee attributed great influence of media diffusion of performance 
information. The documentation by the federal administration and the committee secretariat 
are considered to be more important than media reporting. Furthermore, some interviewed 
parliamentarians pointed out that personal contacts and their issue-networks including 
professionals and cantonal or communal authorities are the most important information 
sources. The two studies that were most often actively remembered and mentioned in the 
interviews with parliamentarians were part of the committees’ documentations. These two 
studies – an evaluation of the coercive measures by the Parliamentary Administration Control 
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(2005) and the monitoring of the social assistance exclusion by the Federal Office of 
Migration (2005) – had attracted also some media attention. In the case of the evaluation of 
the coercive measures, newspapers emphasized that the effectiveness of an extension of the 
detention pending deportation can be doubted based on the findings of this evaluation. 
Nevertheless the majority of the Federal Parliament voted for an extension. 
To sum up, our results suggest that print media did neither function as a diffusion channel nor 
as an important trigger enhancing the influence of performance information in legislative 
revisions. Articles referring to performance information were too scarce to fulfil these 
functions, and thus, the respective hypotheses are rejected. However, our analysis might 
underestimate the functions of mass media because we did focus too strictly on references to 
performance information. Newspapers can of course report on policy performance without 
any references to studies, investigations, trials etc. and in this way, influencing legislative 
revisions in the direction of the performance information. Interview statements as well as 
newspapers articles about the heroin-assisted treatment indicate that the success of this 
treatment was often acknowledge without any explicit references to its scientific evaluation. 
 
Political Context: Which Combination of Factors is Conclusive? 
Following the information-based conditions, we now turn to the set of variables that are 
context-based conditions. 
Institutional setting: ‘Evidence-oriented or norm-driven?’ 
Generating and processing performance information requires capacities including personal, 
financial as well as organizational structures dedicated to this issue. The value of research-
based information and in particular performance information has to be acknowledged by the 
(in-)formal organizational structures respectively the involved people. Table 5 shows that the 
capacities to generate and process performance information varied among the different policy 
fields investigated. In the fields of traffic safety and health policy the federal offices in charge 
had established, at least to a certain degree, an orientation that facilitates the uptake of 
performance information. They have some capacities to generate and process such 
information, and are closely linked to institutions that promote the accumulation, selection 
and interpretation of systematic evidence. However, both offices in charge had no explicit 
case independent strategy when and how performance information should be generated, 
selected and interpreted. In contrast, in the field of asylum policy, the majority of 
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interviewees considered the capacities to generate and process such information as low. 
Furthermore, many interviewees stated a further decline of capacities after 2003 linked to the 
change of the head of the department. Interview statements indicate that scepticism regarding 
performance information, social science and qualitative research in particular predominated in 
the federal offices in charge. The following interview quotes illustrate this orientation: 
“There was no interest to investigate the effects. In contrast to other domains, there was no 
culture of evidence-based decision-making.” (Researcher, translated by the author).  
“The Federal Office for Refugees is strongly influenced by lawyers, who are more interested in 
norms and not necessarily in effects. They were not interested in social sciences and were very 
sceptical with respect to such findings.” (Federal administration, translated by the author). 
At the level of the individual policy measure, we argued that if an evidence-oriented 
administration supported by a policy forum plays a decisive role in an early stage of the 
revision process, learning by performance information is more likely and performance 
information will be more influential in this revision process (see hypothesis 3a). Table 5 
shows mixed results for this hypothesis. 
On the one hand, in the two revision processes, ‘limitation in urban areas’ and ‘heroin-
assisted treatment’, in which performance information was most influential, the 
administration played a decisive role and was supported by an expert forum. In both cases, 
interviewees emphasized the good relationships between the federal offices in charge and the 
producers of Swiss specific performance information. Furthermore, the federal offices in 
charge commissioned the studies that were perceived as most influential in the revision 
processes by the interviewed actors. Furthermore, the institutional setting might also explain 
why performance information played only a moderate or marginal role in the cases of the 
‘BAC limit’ respectively ‘moratorium for new service providers’: In both cases the 
administration played no important role. 
On the other hand, a decisive evidence-oriented administration supported by an expert group 
does not automatically lead to a significant role of performance information in the revision 
process as revealed by two cases (see Table 5). In the case of the ‘authority to advice at-risk 
people’, no performance information was available (see Table 3 on page 11). Thus, the crucial 
question is either why the evidence-oriented administration did not generate performance 
information or, why the administration promoted this revision without performance 
information? In the case of the ‘cascade system’ performance information was available and 
consistent but played only a marginal role although the administration was decisive and 
supported by an expert group. 
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Table 5: The institutional setting shaping the influence of performance information (PI) in legislative revisions (hypothesis 3a) 
 Capacities Role of the federal 
office in charge 
Role of expert 
groups 
Influence of PI in 
pre-parliamentary 
phase 
Overall influence 
of PI in the 
revision process 
Support for H3a 
Speed limitation in urban areas high important important high high yes 
Cascade system important important low low no 
Two-phase driver-training system important important moderate moderate partially 
BAC limit 
high 
marginal marginal moderate moderate partially 
Moratorium for new services providers high marginal not present low no influence yes 
Heroin-assisted treatment important important high high yes 
Authority to advice at-risk people important important not present not present no 
Penalties ‘supplying drugs to minors’ 
high 
marginal marginal not present not present yes 
Social assistance exclusion important marginal low low yes 
Coercive measures I 
low 
important important not present not present yes 
Extended social assistance exclusion marginal not present low low yes 
Coercive measures II 
low (or even no) 
marginal not present low no influence yes 
H3a Hypothesis 3a: If an evidence-oriented administration supported by a policy forum plays a decisive role in an early stage of the revision process, learning form 
performance information is more likely and performance information will be more influential in the revision process. 
Operationalization: 
Capacities: Estimation of the interviewed actors and secondary (grey) literature. The levels ‘high’ respectively ‘low’ represent relative values. 
Role of federal office in charge: Marginal = following the interview statements and documents, the federal office in charge played only a marginal role in the revision 
process, the parliament did not follow its policy proposal; important = following the interview statements and documents, the federal office played an important role in the 
revision process, the Federal Parliament followed its policy proposal to a large extent. 
Role of expert groups: Not present = there was no expert group; marginal = following the interview statements and documents, the expert group played only a marginal 
role in the revision process, the Federal Council and/or the Federal Parliament did not follow its policy proposal; important = following the interview statements and 
documents, the expert group played an important role in the revision process, the Federal Council and the Federal Parliament followed its policy proposal to a large 
extent. 
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Characteristics of the Policy field and the Policy Measure: No conclusive findings yet 
As already outlined above, the analysis reveals that the policy field has a considerable impact 
on the influence of performance information in legislative revisions. Further, the analysis 
suggests that the policy field has not only an impact directly on the consideration of existing 
performance information in policy-making but also on the generation (availability) of 
performance information and the evidence orientation of the administration. 
To deal with the observed differences within a policy field, we introduced the characteristics 
of the policy measure such as the scale of change, the intrusiveness and inclusiveness of the 
policy design and the level of conflict about the revision of the policy measure (hypotheses 
3b). Table 6 shows that none of the policy characteristics explains alone the observed 
differences. For instance, the analysis reveals that the conflict intensity is not the all-dominant 
factor hindering performance information to become influential: In the highly contested 
revision of the ‘BAC limit’ and the ‘heroin-assisted treatment’, performance information had 
a moderate and in the later case even a significant influence in the respective revision 
processes. These two processes have in common, that performance information was available 
already years before it was finally reflected in the federal legislation. Thus, argumentation and 
probably learning required a long period in the context of conflictive debates including 
ideological and emotional considerations about the way of life and economic interests in the 
case of the BAC limit. In all other cases with a high or moderate level of conflict, 
performance information was not or only moderately influential. Not surprisingly, the absence 
of a conflict does not automatically lead to a high influence of performance information. 
If we assume that three out of four investigated characteristics of the policy measure might 
affect the role of performance information in a string way, only five out of twelve cases 
support the postulated hypothesis 3b (see Table 6, second last column). The two cases coming 
close to the ideal of evidence-based policy – ‘speed limitation in urban areas’ and ‘heroin-
assisted treatment’ – support both hypothesis 3b and are connected to a minor change and a 
low level of intrusiveness but differ with respect to the level of conflict and the level of 
inclusion related to the policy measure. 
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Table 6: The policy characteristics shaping the influence of performance information (PI) in the legislative revisions (hypotheses 3b) 
 Scale of 
change 
Intrusiveness Inclusion Conflict 
level 
Influence of 
PI in Pre-
parliamentar
y  
Overall 
influence of 
PI 
Support for 
H3b  
Support for 
Hypothesis 
‘level of 
conflict’ 
Speed reduction in urban areas marginal low* moderate low high high yes yes 
Cascade system major high low low low low partially no 
Two-phase driver training major high high moderate moderate moderate no yes 
BAC limit marginal high high high moderate moderate no partially 
Moratorium for new services providers marginal high moderate moderate low no influence partially yes 
Heroin-assisted treatment marginal low low high high high yes no 
Authority to advice at-risk people marginal low low low not present not present no  no 
Penalty ‘supplying drugs to minors’ marginal high low low not present not present no no 
Social assistance exclusion major high low high low low yes yes 
Coercive measures I marginal high  low moderate not present not present no partially 
Extended social assistance exclusion major high low high low low yes yes 
Coercive measures II major high low high low no influence yes yes 
* If a speed reduction is implemented, it is, of course, binding for all car drivers and thus, it is intrusive. Nevertheless we coded here a low level of intrusiveness because 
the communes/cantons do not have to implement such speed reductions; the federal law provides the possibility to implement such regimes. 
H3b Hypothesis 3b: The degree of the policy field’s affinity to technology, the scale of change, the inclusiveness and intrusiveness of a policy measure and the level of 
conflict will affect the role of PI in legislative revisions. (yes = three out of the four dimension affect the role of PI as postulated). 
Hypothesis ‘level of conflict’: In a highly conflictive context, performance information is less likely to be influential in the revision process. 
Operationalization: 
Scale of change: Marginal = no changes with respects to the aims of the policy measures, slight adaptation of the existing policy instruments; major = changes with 
respects to the aims of the policy measures and/or fundamental changes of the policy instruments (e.g. introduction of new instruments). 
Intrusiveness: Low = policy measure has not a coercive character for the direct policy addresses; high = policy measures is highly coercive for the direct policy addresses. 
Inclusion: Low = direct policy addresses are a well defined, small group of people (e.g. rejected asylum seekers); moderate = a considerable group of people belong to the 
direct policy addresses; high = large part of the resident population belongs to the direct policy addressees (e.g. driving population). 
Conflict level: Low = No noteworthy opposition (small number of votes against the proposal in the national council), no procedure of ironing out differences between the 
two chambers of the Federal Parliament took place and no referendum was held; moderate = no referendum was held, but the policy proposal was either not supported by 
a 2/3-majority of the national council or a procedure of ironing out differences on essential elements of the policy proposal took place; high = the policy proposal was not 
support by a 2/3-majority of the national council and a procedure of ironing out differences took place or a referendum was held. 
 
In several cases the influence of performance information was lower than we would have 
expected based on the political context conditions. However, these cases except one (‘cascade 
system’) can be explained if the condition ‘characteristics of existing performance 
information’ is also taken into account. In the case ‘cascade system’, we observed only a low 
influence of performance information although performance information was available and 
the political context with respect to the level of conflict and the level of inclusion rather 
favourable. Document analysis and interview data indicate that performance information was 
neglected in this case in favour of professional experiences of the cantonal authorities. 
Finally, empirical insights, mainly interview data, reveal that the complexity of the policy 
measure respectively of the problem to solve might be a further variable that should be 
considered in the analysis. In six out of eight cases in which performance information played 
no or only a marginal role, interviewees emphasized the problem of the transferability of 
findings from other countries due to the high diversity and complexity of the issue at stake 
(asylum legislation and the system of the provision and financing of medical services). 
Furthermore, they pointed out that causal frameworks (chain of effects) of the policy 
measures are complex and additionally, that the effectiveness of this policy measure are 
influenced by other policy measures and various context factors which can not be controlled 
or influenced by the state. 
 
Conclusion 
The evidence-based policy movement raises new research interest in a realistic view of the 
influence of research-based evidence on ‘what works’, so called performance information, in 
democratic politics. Insights about the realization of evidence-based policy can contribute to 
the debate on the desirability, challenges as well as pitfalls of evidence-based policy-making. 
Findings can help to clarify the potential of evidence-based policy with respect to the 
functioning of the democratic process, such as accountability and responsiveness but as well 
as its capacity to improve policy solutions, creating or resisting policy failures and thereby 
support the output-oriented legitimacy (see also Widmer forthcoming). In this context, the 
aim of this paper was to assess and explain the influence of performance information in 
legislative revisions at the Swiss federal level. Existing literature does not propose a 
comprehensive, accepted theoretical framework for such an analysis (se for instance James 
and Jorgensen 2009), therefore we elaborated an integrative framework inspired by the idea of 
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an information flow taking place in a political context. The empirical analysis of the twelve 
cases of revisions of policy measures revealed that this framework is appropriate and 
promising for the analysis of such a multifaceted, cognitive phenomenon. 
As expected, the investigation showed that the influence of performance information varied 
not only between policy fields but also within a single policy field. There is support for the 
hypothesis that the characteristics of the existing performance information are a powerful 
explanation for the influence of performance information in legislative revisions. The 
influence of performance information varied in accordance with the strength of the existing 
performance information in eleven out of twelve cases. Thus, this analysis supports existing 
research concentrating on the characteristics of evidence (Weiss and Bucuvalas 1989, 
respectively more recently Esterling 2004). However, the presented analysis faces some 
limitation because it did not weight the different studies according to their quality to measure 
the strength of existing performance information. 
Further, this investigation revealed that it can not be taken for granted that performance 
information is available, neither about the policy measure in place in Switzerland nor about 
the same or other policy solutions implemented in other jurisdictions. This finding challenges 
the concept of evidence-based policy that assumes the availability of performance 
information. 
The analysis of newspaper reporting on performance information showed that the power of 
mass media enhancing the influence of performance information in policy-making might be 
overestimated in literature. Newspapers did report only very rarely on performance 
information. The question arises, if the framework should instead of emphasizing the 
functions of mass media more focussing on other information channels. To substantiate such a 
framework modification, a more detailed media content analysis would be appropriate. The 
analysis presented in this paper faces a limitation in concentrating on references to 
performance information. The content analysis did not require a reference with a complete 
bibliography, but an indication that the performance of a public policy was reported based on 
an investigation. Therefore, an analysis on media reporting about the policy performance 
without any references to systematic evidence would complete the picture and help to 
evaluate the role of mass media also from a democratic theory standpoint of view. These 
preliminary findings indicate that newspapers are not interested in informing the citizens 
about the known, evidence-based consequence of a policy measure and in this respect, the 
findings are quite disturbing. 
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The analysis further provided quite conclusive results with respect to the impact of the policy 
field and the institutional setting on the influence of performance information in legislative 
revisions. The findings revealed that the policy field, its affinity to technology and science has 
a strong impact not only on the uptake of existing performance information in the revision 
process but also on the evidence-orientation of the administration and the generation of 
performance information. Following these considerations, the framework can be modified by 
postulating these interdependences explicitly. The test of the hypothesis that policy 
characteristics shape the influence of performance information in legislative revisions is not 
yet conclusive and needs further theoretical and empirical analysis. Further analysis will 
differentiate more with respect to the involved actors (differentiate between type of actors, 
number of involved actors), the phases of the revision processes as well as to the performance 
information explicitly present and influential in the processes. 
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Appendix 
Table 7: Composition of the selected interviewees 
Case: Policy measure Producers of PI, 
researchers* 
Other involved 
actors** 
Federal offices Parliamentary 
committees 
Total
Speed reduction in urban areas  2 4 2 -- 8 
Cascade system 1  2  3 
Two-phase driver-training system 1  3  4 
BAC limit  1  3  4 
Moratorium for new service providers 1 4 1 3 9 
Heroin-assisted treatment 3 1 1 3 7***
Authority to advice at-risk people 3 1 1 3 7***
Penalty “supplying drugs to minors” 3 1 1 3 7***
Social assistance exclusion 1 3 7 4 15 
Coercive measures I 2 2 6 4 14 
Extended social assistance exclusion 1 3 3 5 12 
Coercive measures II 2 2 3 6 13 
In total 45 interviews were conducted within our research project, 35 by Kathrin Frey and 10 by Christine 
Zollinger as part of her master thesis. She kindly provided the interview data for this analysis. Some 
interviewees provided us with insights for several policy measures. 
* Producer of PI and researcher who are not employees of a federal office. 
** E.g. interest organisations, expert commissions, cantonal authorities 
*** One of the interviewees was at the same time producer of PI as well as member of the parliamentary 
committee in charge of the revision 
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